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Abstract
This paper focuses on evaluating the systemic risk in interbank networks, proposing a series
of measurements: risk distance, risk degree and m-order risk degree. The proposed mea-
surements are formally proven to have good basic and extended properties that are able to
reflect the effect of bank size, liability size, liability distribution, and the discount factor on the
default risk, not only of a single bank, but also of the entire system. Additionally, the above-
mentioned properties and the relationship between risk distance and financial contagion
indicate the rationality embodied in the proposed measurements. This paper also provides
some implications on how to decrease or prevent the systemic risk in an interbank system.
1 Introduction
Since the Asian financial crisis of 1997, special attention has been paid to the role of the grow-
ing interconnectedness between financial institutions among the many factors that affect
financial contagion [1,2]. Particularly after the global crisis of 2007–08, the architecture of
financial system building on the abovementioned interconnectedness was viewed as being cru-
cial for its central role in the financial contagion [3–5]. In fact, the abovementioned intercon-
nectedness between financial institutes constitutes the edge of a financial network and the
corresponding financial institutes are regarded as the nodes. Particularly, following numerous
studies in this field such as [6] and [7], we also focus on the interbank system that can be
considered as a fundamental structure for complex financial systems. Note that interbank bor-
rowing and loans, if any, form the abovementioned interconnectedness that link the corre-
sponding banks in the interbank network [8]. The network representation allows to study
propagation of failures: recalling the two mentioned financial crisis, for example, one bank’s
insolvency may lead to the default cascades in the interbank network. Here, two periods are
considered: several banks are assumed to default in the first period and the set of these banks is
named initial default set, and then in the second period, some of the remaining banks may be
induced to default because of the existing borrowing and loan links. Facing this phenomenon,
we want to explore two problems. The first one is when one bank’s insolvency occur, which
bank will be the next victim? The second one is which initial default set will cause the largest
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0200209 July 12, 2018 1 / 18
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
OPENACCESS
Citation: Li Y, Liu G, Pin P (2018) Network-based
risk measurements for interbank systems. PLoS
ONE 13(7): e0200209. https://doi.org/10.1371/
journal.pone.0200209
Editor: Filippo Radicchi, Indiana University,
UNITED STATES
Received: January 31, 2018
Accepted: June 21, 2018
Published: July 12, 2018
Copyright: © 2018 Li et al. This is an open access
article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author and
source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are
within the paper. Note that this paper mainly
focuses on the theoretical analysis and only some
numerical examples are provided. All the data
adopted in the numerical examples have been
contained and reported in our paper, and thus no
supporting information files are further needed in
our opinion.
Funding: This work was supported by the National
Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant
71501034 and 71771041 (to YL), by China
Postdoctoral Science Foundation under Grant
2016M590230 and 2017T100183 (to YL), and by
amount of banks to default in the second period? This paper will inherit the idea of risk propa-
gation in networks [9] to cope with the two problems by way of providing a series of conve-
nient measurements.
More concretely, if the answer of the first question is known in advance of financial conta-
gion, we can inject liquidity into the more susceptive banks to avoid the spread of the crisis.
As the first contribution, we provide a new measurement named risk distance, with the prop-
erty that a shorter risk distance with the given initial default set means a higher likelihood of
default. Among a growing literature on risk analysis in financial networks, the harmonic dis-
tance presented by [10] is noteworthy because it captures the susceptibility of each bank to the
distress of any other, so that it functions similarly to our proposed risk distance. However, the
risk distance that we define is different from the harmonic distance in two aspects: one is that
our risk distance considers the cash and marketable assets carried by the banks so that the ana-
lysed banks can be heterogeneous, the other is that the risk distance defined here does not
assume that the initial default set only contains a single bank. As a result, we prove that our
newly proposed risk distance has several different properties with the famous harmonic dis-
tance in the following parts of this paper. Overall, our risk distance is a node-level (or say
microscopic) indicator that reflects the default likelihood of the remaining banks given an ini-
tial default set.
Besides, the second question aims to find the “important” banks from the perspective of
financial system risk. To that end, this paper further provides a second new measurement
that can reflect the amount of “damage” caused by the initial default set, which is the second
contribution. Then, the “damages” caused by different initial default sets of the same size
can be compared to find which initial default set is most harmful. In particular, when the
initial default set contains only one bank, the above problem can be simplified into finding
the critical node and measuring its influence on causing financial contagion. Intuitively, the
famous Katz-Bonacich centrality can provide the basic idea concerning how to address such
a problem [11,12]. With Katz-Bonacich centrality’s becoming conventional wisdom [13,14],
we attempt to inherit the basic framework of this centrality and to further develop it to solve
the new problem, now that the classical Katz-Bonacich centrality cannot be directly adopted
here [15]. The key challenge of solving this problem is how to establish a new matrix that
fully reflects the financial system in order to replace the classical adjacent matrix used in
Katz-Bonacich centrality when an initial default set is given. Fortunately, [16] has established
a Markov transfer matrix with absorbing states, which inspires us on how to obtain a system
matrix with the information of the initial default set. As a result, this paper successfully pro-
poses the risk degree of a given initial default set and the risk degrees of an m-order initial
default set, which reflects the default risk caused by a given initial default set and the maximal
system risk caused by all possible default sets with any m banks, respectively. Overall, the
newly provided measurements, called risk degree and m-order risk degree, belong to the
type of system-level (i.e., macroscopic) indicators that reflect the collapsing force of the
default sets.
Furthermore, apart from the three newly established measurements, this paper also focuses
on uncovering these measurements’ properties and demonstrating their rationale, which con-
stitutes the third contribution. Specifically, our provided measurements are considered as a
function of liability size, liability distribution, bank size and the discount factor, and we further
find a much deeper relationship between the provided measurements and the number of failed
banks caused by financial contagion. By extending the stylized setup used in papers such as
those by [17–19], we also represent interbank systems that consists of n banks that are linked
via unsecured debt contracts. Finally, abstracting from the background of finance, the nodes of
our model have analogies with nodes of information in processes where knowledge is shared
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instead of risk [20]. So, in the future, managers or government officers monitoring the finan-
cial system may be inspired by more general results that fit this analogy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows, to present the abovementioned ideas and con-
tributions. Section 2 starts from the balance sheet of inter-banks and then defines the three
new measurements based on the payment balance of these banks. Section 3 provides the basic
properties of the proposed measurements, and Section 4 further proves the extended proper-
ties, which are useful to validate the rationality of the proposed measurements. Section 5 con-
cludes and discusses the managerial implications.
2 Network-based risk measurements
2.1 Balance sheet and payment equilibrium
An interbank system is considered here, which consists of several banks that are linked by
interbank lending via unsecured debt contracts signed at the initial period. To better clarify
the risk contagion process, we start with the balance sheet of a stylized commercial bank within
the interbank system. As illustrated in Fig 1, bank i’s total assets Ai are composed of liquidities
ci, securities si, interbank loans li and other assets pi; thus, the following equation holds:
Ai ¼ ci þ si þ li þ pi: ð1Þ
Meanwhile, bank i’s total liabilities Hi consist of shareholder equity ei, deposits di, interbank
borrowing bi and other liabilities qi:
Hi ¼ ei þ di þ bi þ qi: ð2Þ
In fact, the risk in interbank payment systems can originate from different factors; for
example, [21] discussed how a shock to deposits could lead to the bank’s default on interbank
borrowing or even part of its retail deposits, and [22] considered that the uncertain returns
on banks’ securities and other assets were likely to cause a system risk. Unlike the abovemen-
tioned studies, this paper does not distinguish the reasons that cause the risk, but rather
focuses on the bank’s default induced by any possible initial shocks. Moreover, we further
assume that each bank embedded in the interbank system have borrowing or loans at least
with the other one bank, namely bi> 0 and li> 0, because the banks without any interbank
lending and borrowing are isolated nodes and should not be considered into the interbank
system.
Note that the liabilities displayed in the balance sheet can be divided into the senior type
and the junior type, and therefore they should be repaid in a different order when shocks
occur. Here, the deposits di have seniority relative to the bank’s other liabilities; in other
words, the available liquidities of bank i should repay di first and then bi as well as the other lia-
bilities. Furthermore, the other liabilities generally contain long-term borrowing, bonds and
sub debts that really exist as a commercial bank’s liabilities as displayed in Fig 1. Although
interbank borrowings and other liabilities mentioned above both belong to the junior liabili-
ties, interbank borrowings are always short-term and other liabilities are often long-term.
Thus, we consider that interbank borrowings should be repaid firstly and immediately com-
pared to other liabilities.
Let ali denote the total available liquidities of bank i, and then regardless of the reasons that
cause the shocks, two cases may exist: (1) if ali< di, bank i is called complete default. In this
case, the total available liquidities of bank i are not enough to pay its senior liabilities; (2) if
di ali< di + bi, bank i is called part default, which means that, in this case, senior liabilities
can be paid in full and the junior creditors are repaid in part. Furthermore, let xij (j 6¼ i) denote
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the amount of money borrowed by bank j from bank i. When bank j is in part default, the
amount of money repaid by bank j to bank i (denoted as yij) is in proportion to their contract
xij. In mathematics, we have
yij ¼
xij
P
i xij
alj   dj
 
¼
xij
bj
alj   dj
 
: ð3Þ
Summarizing the two cases above, yij can be further expressed as
yij ¼
xij
bj
max 0;min alj   dj; bj
n on o
; ð4Þ
where xij implies the network structure imbedded in the interbank payments, and therefore
their interdependence may induce a cascade of defaults when one or more banks default.
Then, Eq (4) will be useful in determining the payment equilibrium because part default actu-
ally exists when financial contagion occurs in interbank payments.
Furthermore, because rapid liquation is costly in most cases, bank i can only recover a frac-
tion ηi< 1 of the securities si and other assets pi, where the defined fraction ηi is defined as the
discount factor of bank i. According to the expression of repaid money shown in Eq (4), the
total available liquidities of bank i can be expressed as
ali ¼ ci þ
X
j
yij þ Ziðsi þ piÞ: ð5Þ
Here, ∑jyij denotes the realised payments made by all the other banks.
To sum up, Eq (4) is a rule that a bank returns the interbank borrowings when facing
default, and Eq (5) measures the total available liquidity of a bank. By considering Eqs (4) and
Fig 1. Balance sheet of a stylized commercial bank.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0200209.g001
Network-based risk measurements for interbank systems
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0200209 July 12, 2018 4 / 18
(5) together, it seems that the fix-point method can directly be adopted by using the framework
of [1], but we do not adopt it in our model setting because the fix-point method ignores the
time process of risk contagion to some extent and potentially assumes that all the banks can
make the optimal decisions at the same time when the default risk appears in the system. Paral-
lel to these studies related to DebtRank [23,24], this paper also pays attention to the dynamic
process of risk contagion and provides the dynamic mechanism as displayed in the next sub-
section. Besides, this paper defines and validates several risk distances without needing all the
banks make the optimal decisions at the same time, and therefore the method of this paper is
quite different with fix-point method.
2.2 Mechanism of risk contagion
In order to make clear the mechanism of risk contagion captured by this paper, Fig 2 provides
a visual and simple representation, where the interbank system consists of three banks with
different bank sizes and these banks are linked by their lending-borrowing relationship. Here,
the process of risk contagion can be roughly divided into three successive phases.
As Phase 1 displays, one of the banks suffers a sufficiently large negative shock so as to
completely default, and thus the other banks’ loans to this bank become unrecoverable. As a
result, the unrecoverable loads cause the bank with bigger size distressed and the one with the
smaller size completely default in Phase 2. Subsequently, the complete default of the smaller
bank causes the remaining bank’s loan to it unrecoverable so that the remaining bank can also
default at this time as shown in Phase 3. Although the real interbank system always contain
more banks than our simple example, the mechanism of risk contagion is similar. Note that
when part default appears, Eqs (4) and (5) are useful to determine how much repaid money
can be received within the mechanism of risk contagion displayed in Fig 2.
2.3 Risk distance, risk degree and m-order risk degree
The considered interbank system consists of n banks indexed by N = {1, 2,   , n}, and the
lending- borrowing matrix, denoted as X, is expressed as X = [xij]i,j2N, where xij (j 6¼ i) denote
the amount of money borrowed by bank j from bank i (we pose xii = 0). Based on the defined
Fig 2. Sketch map of risk contagion.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0200209.g002
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matrix X, the deduced system matrix G = [gij]i,j2N is defined as below.
gii ¼
ci þ Ziðpi þ siÞ
ci þ Ziðpi þ siÞ þ
P
k6¼i xik
when j ¼ i;
gij ¼
xij
ci þ Ziðpi þ siÞ þ
P
k6¼i xik
when j 6¼ i:
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
ð6Þ
Here, gij (i 6¼ j) represents the ratio of the amount of money lent from bank i to bank j to
bank i’s total the total available liquidities. Then, it is not difficult to find that gij 0 (j 2 N)
and ∑j2Ngij = 1 so that the deduced matrix G can be understood as a Markov transfer matrix.
Note that the above designed matrix does not contain yij expressed in Eq (4), but is dependent
on xij, which implies that the designed matrix G does not change once the balance sheet is
given. In fact, the unchanged G facilitates the calculations because we do not need to change
G frequently with the change of yij (yij is endogenous variable of our model). Besides, in order
to check the designed G is good or not, we test the designed G whether to satisfy much more
desirable properties. In other words, if the designed G can meet much more good properties
in measuring the system risk of risk contagion, it is a good design; otherwise, we should try
the other forms of G. To be honest, the reported G in Eq (6) is selected from numerous possi-
ble forms and is found to meet much more desirable properties compared to the other tried
forms, which will be presented in details in the latter part of this paper.
Let S denote the set of initial default banks; for example, if the initial default set only con-
tains bank j, then S = {j}, and if the initial default set contains banks i and j, then S = {i, j}. The
risk distance from a non-default bank to the initial default set S is given in Definition 1.
[Definition 1] (risk distance). The risk distance from each non-default bank to the initial
default set S is expressed in the vector R−s:
R  S ¼
½I   bG
  S
  1
 1T
n
; ð7Þ
Where 0< β< 1 guaranteeing that the inverse matrix exists, I is an #(N − S) × #(N − S) iden-
tity matrix, 1 is an #(N − S) vector consisting of 1, and G−s is G deleting the rows and the col-
umns of the banks contained in the set S. In addition, the ith element of R−s is denoted as ri,S
that represents the risk distance from ith bank to the default bank set S.
By recalling the defined Eq (6), the normalization is a useful procedure, whose theoretical
basis is Markov chain, by noting that the normalized matrix can be understood or regarded as
a Markov transfer matrix. If the status of default is regarded as the absorbing state, the defined
risk distance in Eq (7) can be similarly understood as a likelihood that each remaining bank
does not reach the absorbing state, according to the principle of finite-state Markov chain.
Thus, a longer risk distance means a lower likelihood of default, which accords with our com-
mon sense. Interestingly, this form is quite similar to the famous Katz-Bonacich centrality in
the field of network science [11].
Further, taking gij (i 6¼ j) as an example without loss of generality, the mechanism of risk
contagion explained in Section 2.2 means the following statements: when bank i face the risk
of complete default, bank j should first returned the money borrowed from bank i, so gij = 0
at this time; and then even if bank i has received all the money that was lent out to the other
banks, bank i can also completely default so that it appears in the initial default set S, and at
this time, gij = 0 because complete default means that bank i cannot return the money bor-
rowed from bank j (8j 6¼ i). By considering the above mechanism, we should delete the rows
and the columns of the banks in the initial default set S, which interprets why we adopt the G−s
to calculate the risk distance in Eq (7).
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As a result, the normalization is important here for three reasons. First, the normalization
guarantees that the sum of elements in each row equals 1, which accords with the definition of
Markov transfer matrix, and therefore, the principle of Markov transfer matrix can be adopted
directly as we have explained. Second, the normalization makes each element in the normal-
ized matrix reflect the ratio of the corresponding liabilities, so that the bank size is potentially
considered. In fact, the bank size, defined as the total amount of assets (or liabilities) of one
bank, is an important factor influencing the risk contagion. To make it clear, if two banks bor-
row the same amount of money from another bank but the two banks have different sizes, the
normalization will shows different ratios of the borrowed money in the two banks, but without
the normalization, the effect of bank size cannot be reflected. Moreover, the normalization can
also reflect the effect from each bank’s discount factor ηi (8i 2 N), which is also important in
the process of risk contagion.
Subsequently, let rv(S) denote the risk degree of the whole interbank system given the initial
default set S. Based on the defined risk distance (see Definition 1), rv(S) is defined as follows.
[Definition 2] (risk degree). Given the initial default set S, the risk degree rvs is defined as
rvS ¼ 1  R  Sð Þ
  1
; ð8Þ
where 1 is an #(N − S) vector whose elements are all 1. In other words,1  R−s equals the sum of
all of the elements in R−s
Recalling the explanations of Definition 1, the longer risk distance means a lower likelihood
of default. Here, we first sum all the distances from the remaining banks to the given initial
default set, and accordingly the mathematical expression is 1  R−s. Note that a larger value of
1  R−s means a lower system risk degree, which does not accord with our common sense.
Thus, we use (1  R−s)
−1 to measure the system risk degree to avoid this problem.
Furthermore, from the perspective of the system, we can compare the risk degrees relative
to all possible initial default sets and determine the maximal risk degree and the corresponding
default set. Considering the amount of default banks that will affect the risk degree, we keep
this amount identical for fair comparison. As a result, let rvm(G) denote the m-order risk
degree of the given system G, where m is the number of banks contained in the given initial
default set S. For example, when m = 2, rv2(G) means the maximum sum of risk distance from
each non-default bank to any possible default bank sets which contain two banks. Then, the
rvm(G) is defined as below, where m = 1, 2,   , n.
[Definition 3] (m-order risk degree). For all initial default sets containing m banks, the
maximal risk degree among all initial default sets is defined as the m-order risk degree, whose
mathematical expression is
rvmðGÞ ¼ maxi1 ;i2 ;;im2N
ð1  R  fi1;i2 ;;imgÞ
  1
; ð9Þ
Where i1, i1,   , im are the different banks contained in the initial default set and, therefore,
the total number of their combination is n!/(m!(n −m)!).
Keeping the number of banks in initial default set identical, the defined m-order risk degree
identifies not only the maximal risk degree for all possible initial default sets containing m
banks but also the corresponding default set that leads to the highest system risk.
3 Basic properties
This section aims to provide the basic properties of the proposed three measurements. In
detail, these basic properties include the non-negativity, the asymmetry and the monotonicity
of the defined risk distance, the monotonicity of the risk degree, and the heterogeneity of
Network-based risk measurements for interbank systems
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different-order risk degrees. Although these basic properties seem natural at first glance, they
can not only deepen our understanding of the proposed measurements but also illustrate the
rationality of these measurements.
[Property B1] (Non-negativity of risk distance). For any given system G and the initial
default set S, the risk distance defined in Eq (7) and the corresponding risk degree defined in
Eq (8) are both non-negative.
Proof. Because each element of G−S  1
T is no more than 1 and 0<β<1, it holds that
½I   bG  S
  1
¼ Iþ bG  S þ b
2G  S
2 þ    : ð10Þ
Eq (10) clearly shows that all of the elements in [I − βG−S]−1 are non-negative since all of
the elements in G−s are non-negative. Thus, Property B1 is immediately obtained.
[Property B2] (Asymmetry of risk distance). The risk distance from the bank i to the initial
default set {j} must not be equal to that from bank j to the initial default set {i}.
Proof. Here, we provide an example to show that ri,{j} 6¼ rj,{i}. Given β = 0.9, the correspond-
ing system matrix of the three banks is set as below:
0:5 0:3 0:2
0:1 0:3 0:6
0:4 0:4 0:2
0
B
@
1
C
A:
As a result, r2,{1} = 3.36 and r1,{2} = 2.59, which immediately obtains the result.
[Property B3] (Monotonicity of risk distance). For any given system G, it holds that
ri,{s} ri,{s,t}, where i 6¼ s and t 6¼ i, s.
Proof. According to Eqs (7) and (10), we have
ri;fsg   ri;fs;tg ¼
bgit þ b
2
P
l 6¼s;t gilglt þ
P
k6¼s gkigit
h i
þ   
n
: ð11Þ
If only considering the path starting from t and ending at i, we can further have
ri;fsg   ri;fs;tg 
Pþ1
l¼1 b
ig ½lit
n
; ð12Þ
where g ½lit means the product of all of the elements in the path starting from i and ending at t
with the length of l in G−s. Then, because gij (i, j 2 N) are all non-negative, it is not difficult to
determine that ri,{s} ri,{s,t}.
The above three basic properties of the defined risk distance show that (1) the defined risk
distance is non-negative, which accords with our common sense; (2) banks takes different
effect on the system risk or financial contagion according to the different positions in the net-
works and thus have an asymmetrical risk distance; and (3) adding one more bank to the initial
default set will not increase the risk distance, which is true because much greater bank default-
ing in the first period often implies much greater fragility for the entire system.
[Property B4] (Monotonicity of risk degree). For any given financial system G, it holds that
rvm+1(G) rvm(G), where m = 1, 2,   , n.
Proof. For any {i1, i2,   , im} and {i1, i2,   , im}\{ik}(k = 1, 2,   , m), it holds that
1  R  fi1 ;i2 ;;img  1  R  fi1;i2 ;;imgnfikg; ð13aÞ
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because of the proven monotonicity of risk distance in Property B3. Then, we have
1  R  fi1 ;i2 ;;img
   1
 1  R  fi1 ;i2 ;;imgnfikg
   1
; ð13bÞ
because their maximum values inherit the inequality relation. Then, Inequality (13b) guaran-
tees that rvm+1(G) rvm(G).
[Property B5] (Heterogeneity of different-order risk degrees). For two given financial sys-
tems G1 and G2 whose node number is n1 and n2, respectively, if rv1(G1) rv1(G2), then it
must not hold that rvm(G1) rvm(G2), where 2mmin{n1, n2}.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Property B2, we here provide an example to illustrate that
rv1(G1)< rv1(G2) and rv2(G1)> rv2(G2) can exist simultaneously. Additionally, given β = 0.9,
the two system matrices are shown below. According to Definition 3, we have rv1(G1) =
0.0286, rv1(G2) = 0.0342, rv2(G1) = 0.10, and rv2(G2) = 0.0950, meaning that rv1(G1)< rv1(G2)
and rv2(G1)> rv2(G2) can exist simultaneously. Thus, Property B5 holds.
G1 ¼
0:5 0:5
0:5 0:5
0:25 0:25 0:25 0:25
0:25 0:25 0:25 0:25
0:25 0:25 0:25 0:25
0:25 0:25 0:25 0:25
0
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
@
1
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
A
; and G2 ¼
1=3 1=3 1=3
1=3 1=3 1=3
1=3 1=3 1=3
1=3 1=3 1=3
1=3 1=3 1=3
1=3 1=3 1=3
0
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
@
1
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
A
:
Properties B4 and B5 focus on the defined risk degree and m-order risk degree, respectively.
Here, Property B4 implies that adding one more bank to the initial default set S will not
decrease the risk degree of the financial system, and Property B5 indicates that if one system’s
1-order risk degree is larger than another system’s 1-order risk degree, we can’t take for that
the system’s higher order risk degree is still larger. In fact, two conflicting perspectives exist
in the existing literature: one perspective supports that a more connected network structure
enhances the system’s resilience [25], whereas the other suggests that dense interconnections
will cause a destabilizing force to decrease the system’s risk [26]. The illustrated Property B5
can explain the conflicting findings from the defined different order risk degree.
4 Extended properties
Almost every central bank needs deposit reserves and limits the reserve requirement, i.e. ci / di,
according to the specific law of its nation. Although the deposit reserve ratio of each bank is
slightly different, we can assume a constant ratio of di to Hi since empirical analysis finds that
such a ratio is almost the same for different banks within one nation [27]. Thus, we make the
following assumption.
[Assumption 1] For any given system G, we assume that di = γHi for all i 2N, where
0 < γ< 1.
Based on Assumption 1, for any given initial default set S, if the default set S leads to the
complete default of bank i (i =2 S) with the risk contagion, then the following inequality will
hold:
ci þ Ziðpi þ siÞ þ
P
j yij
ci þ pi þ si þ
P
j xij
< g; ð14Þ
Where ali has been defined in Eq (5), meaning that the numerator is the available asset after
the risk contagion caused by the initial default set S and the denominator is the initial available
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asset. Furthermore, we next provide several extended properties to demonstrate the rationality
of the proposed measurements; in other words, to check whether the proposed measurements
can correctly reflect the system risk as the function of liability size, liability distribution, bank
size and the discount factor. Additionally, the relationship between financial contagion and
risk distance is also explored, which is significant and meaningful for validating the rationality
of the proposed measurements.
4.1 Relationship between financial contagion and risk distance
First, we explore whether the defined risk distance can reflect the risk level of banks by control-
ling the effect of the discount factor. To this end, this subsection sets ηi = 1 (i 2 N) to focus on
the relationship between financial contagion and risk distance. Specifically, given an initial
default set S, if bank i defaults with the financial contagion, then do all the banks that are
shorter to the set S than bank i? The following Property E1 gives the answer.
[Property E1] For any given initial default set S and two banks i and j (i, j =2 S) in a given
system G with ηi = 1 for any i 2 N, if bank j completely defaults with the financial contagion
and ri,S < rj,S for any β 2 (0, 1), then bank i must completely default. In addition, there exists
Δr, such that bank w defaults if rw,S < Δr.
Proof. For any given initial default set S and ηi = 1 for any i 2 N, Eq (5) and Assumption 1
guarantee that the necessary and sufficient condition of bank j completely defaulting is
alj
X
k=2S
gjk < galj or
X
k=2S
gjk < g; ð15Þ
Recalling Eqs (3) and (5), Inequality (15) equals
1jðI   G  SÞ1
T > 1   g: ð16Þ
On the other hand, ri,S < rj,S can be further expressed as
ð1i   1jÞ  ½I   bG  S
  1
 1T < 0; ð17Þ
and the Taylor expansion guarantees that
ð1i   1jÞ  ðG  S þ bG
2
  S½I   bG  S
  1
Þ  1T < 0; ð18Þ
which holds for any β 2 (0, 1). Then, let β! 0, and we immediately obtain that
ð1i   1jÞ  G  S  1
T < 0; ð19Þ
which equals 1i(I − G−S)1T > 1j(I − G−S)1T > 1 − γ. Thus, the first part of Property E2 holds.
As a deduction, let Δr = max(rk,S | bank k defaults), and then the second part of Property E2
is obtained based on the result of the first part.
Property E1 provides the answer of the question is YES. Again, given an initial default set S,
if bank i defaults with the financial contagion, all the banks shorter to the set S than bank i will
default. Thus, the defined risk distance is demonstrated to be reasonable because it can fully
reflect the insolvency contagion of banks when banks can liquate their assets freely. Note that
the effect of the discount factor will be discussed in Subsection 4.5 to enrich our illustrations.
4.2 Risk measurements as a function of liability size
In this subsection, we first check whether the increase in all pairwise liabilities raises the system
risk, and the following Lemma 1 gives the answer.
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[Lemma 1] For any given financial system G and an initial default set S, let ~xij ¼ axij for all
i 6¼ j and α> 1 in the new financial system denoted as ~G. If bank i (i =2 S) completely defaults
with the risk contagion in G, then it must completely default in ~G.
Proof. Here, we first investigate the relationship of the available assets of bank i (i =2 S)
between G and ~G, and its results are as follows:
ci þ Ziðpi þ siÞ þ
P
j ~yij
ci þ pi þ si þ
P
j ~xij

ci þ Ziðpi þ siÞ þ a
P
j yij
ci þ pi þ si þ a
P
j xij
; ð20Þ
because of Eq (5) and the fact that ~ali < a  ali. Then, because α> 1 and ∑jxij> ∑jyij, it is not
difficult to obtain that
ci þ Ziðpi þ siÞ þ a
P
j yij
ci þ pi þ si þ a
P
j xij
<
ci þ Ziðpi þ siÞ þ
P
j yij
ci þ pi þ si þ
P
j xij
: ð21Þ
Then, according to Inequality (14), for the given default set S and bank i (i =2 S), it holds that
ci þ Ziðpi þ siÞ þ
P
j yij
ci þ pi þ si þ
P
j xij
< g; ð22Þ
and Inequalities (20) and (21) guarantee that
ci þ Ziðpi þ siÞ þ
P
j ~yij
ci þ pi þ si þ
P
j ~xij
< g: ð23Þ
Overall, Lemma 1 holds.
The proven Lemma 1 gives us a hint that increasing all pairwise liabilities in the network
will raise the systemic risk, because the banks that completely default in G also completely
default in ~G. Note that, here, we use the number of banks that completely default to depict the
level of system risk. Then, we further check whether the defined risk measurements can cor-
rectly reflect the change in the system risk when all pairwise liabilities rise, as discussed above.
As a result, by keeping all liquidities ci, securities si and other assets pi unchanged, the following
Property E2 gives the answer.
[Property E2] For any given financial system G, if ~xij ¼ axij for all i 6¼ j and α> 1 in the
new financial system denoted as ~G, for any given initial default set S, the defined risk distance
is shorter, and the defined risk degree and the m-order risk degree are larger in the new finan-
cial system.
Proof. Based on the definition of G = [gij]i,j2N in Eq (5), the relationship between ~G and G
is
I   ~G  S ¼ TðaÞ I   G  S½ ; ð24Þ
and
TðaÞ ¼ diag
a
ð1   aÞg11 þ a
;
a
ð1   aÞg22 þ a
;    ;
a
ð1   aÞgnn þ a
 
: ð25Þ
whose elements are all more than 1. Then,
I   b ~G  S ¼ TðaÞ I   bG  S½  þ ð1   bÞ I   TðaÞ½ : ð26Þ
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Now, I   b ~G  S is considered the function of α, and we further have
@ I   b ~G  S
   1
@a
 1 ¼   I   b ~G  S
   1 @ I   b ~G  S
 
@a
I   b ~G  S
   1
 1: ð27Þ
On one hand, all of the elements in I   b ~G  S
   1
are non-negative, which has been proven
in Property B1. On the other hand,
@ I   bG~
  S
 
@a
¼
@TðaÞ
@a
I   bG  S½    ð1   bÞ
@TðaÞ
@a
¼
@TðaÞ
@a
TðaÞ½   1 I   bG~
  S
 
  ð1   bÞ I   TðaÞð Þ
  
  ð1   bÞ
@TðaÞ
@a
;
ð28Þ
and therefore, Eq (27) is equivalent to
@ I   bG~
  S
   1
@a
 1 ¼   I   bG~
  S
   1 @TðaÞ
@a
TðaÞ½   1  1þ ð1   bÞ I   bG~
  S
   1 @TðaÞ
@a
TðaÞ½   1 I   bG~
  S
   1
¼ I   bG~
  S
   1 @TðaÞ
@a
ð1   bÞ I   bG~
  S
   1
  I
 
 1:
ð29Þ
Note that ð1   bÞ I   b ~G  S
   1
  I ¼ b I   b ~G  S
   1 ~G  S   I
  
and because all of the ele-
ments in ~G  S   I
  
 1 are less than 0. Thus, all of the elements in I   b ~G  S
   1
 1 are decreas-
ing functions of α, meaning that the defined risk distance obtains its maximal value when
α! 1 and obtains its minimum value when α! +1. Furthermore, because the inequality
of risk degrees holds for any initial default set S, the inequality is naturally inherited by the
defined m-order risk degree. Thus, Property E2 holds, and we also obtain the boundary of the
defined measurements when the liability size changes.
Overall, Property E2 reflects that the rise in pairwise liabilities will increase the systemic
risk, regardless of the type of network structure. Hence, controlling the level of total credits in
the system is a method of managing systemic risk. From another perspective, the proposed
measurements can properly reflect the increase in systemic risk, which indicates that the defi-
nition of the proposed measurement is rational.
4.3 Risk measurements as a function of liability distribution
Intuitively, a bank with positive net interbank lending is more likely to be harmed by the risk
contagion because it will get loss from its counterparties’ default. Accordingly, this subsection
focuses on the effect of liability distributions and explores how to arrange the liability distribu-
tion among banks to obtain a smaller system risk degree. To this end, consider any given sys-
tem G, and suppose that each bank’s liability, on one hand, is kept unchanged, (that is, keeping
∑i 6¼ jxij unchanged for any i 2 N to avoid the effect from the amount of liability that has been
proven influential), and, on the other hand, each bank’s total lending amount is kept equal to
its borrowing amount (that is, ∑ixij = ∑jxij to ignore the effect of the difference between the
loan and borrowing amounts). This subsection focuses on the effect of liability distributions
and explores how to arrange the liability distribution among banks to obtain a smaller system
risk degree. The following Property E3 gives the answer.
[Property E3] Given any system G with the precondition that ∑ixij = ∑jxij for any i, j 2N, let
~xij ¼ 0:5ðxij þ xjiÞ for any i, j 2N in the newly generated system ~G so the operation does not
change each bank’s liability. Then, if the same default set S is given for the two systems, we
have rvSð~GÞ  rvSðGÞ and the equation holds if and only if xij = xji holds in the given system G.
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Proof. Here, system ~G changes the liability distribution of the given system G and does not
change each bank’s liability, noting that the precondition guarantees the following equation:
X
j6¼i
~xij ¼ 0:5
X
j6¼i
ðxij þ xjiÞ ¼
X
j6¼i
xij: ð30Þ
Thus, the above operation, which changes the liability distribution, does not change each
bank’s liability. In addition, the above operation does not change ci + ηi  (pi + si) for any i 2N,
meaning that ~g ii ¼ gii. Moreover, we have
~g ij ¼
~xij
P
j6¼i ~xij
¼
0:5ðxij þ xjiÞ
P
j6¼i xij
¼ 0:5ðgij þ gjiÞ: ð31Þ
Accordingly, it holds that ~G ¼ 0:5ðGþ GTÞ.
Knowing rvS(G) = (1  R−S(G))−1, we next focus on the item 1  R−S(G) whose detailed
form is 1  (I − βG−S)−1  1T / n. Accordingly, the problem of proving rvSð~GÞ  rvSðGÞ is
changed into the problem of proving 1  ½I   b ~G
  S
  1
 1T  1  ½I   bG
  S
  1
 1T, where
~G
  S ¼ 0:5ðG  S þ G
T
  SÞ. The following part is to prove the above inequality. First, we have
1  S  ½I   bG  S
  1
 1T
  S
1  S  ½I   b ~G   S 
  1
 1T
  S
¼
1  S  0:5ð½I   bG  S
  1
þ ½I   bG  S
  T
Þ  1T
  S
1  S  ½I   b ~G   S 
  1
 1T
  S
 max
kyk¼1
y  0:5ð½I   bG  S
  1
þ ½I   bG  S
  T
Þ  yT
y  ½I   b ~G
  S

  1
 yT
:
ð32Þ
Then, because 0.5([I − βG−S]−1 + [I − βG−S]−T) and ½I   b ~G  S
  1
are both symmetric matri-
ces, the theorem of Rayleigh-Ritz guarantees that
max
kyk¼1
y  0:5ð½I   bG
  S
  1
þ ½I   bG
  S
  T
Þ  yT
y  ½I   b ~G
  S
  1
 yT
¼ lmax 0:5ð½I   bG  S
  1
þ ½I   bG
  S
  T
Þ  ½I   b ~G
  S
 
¼ lmax 0:5ð½I   bG  S
  1
þ ½I   bG
  S
  T
Þ  0:5ð½I   bG
  S þ ½I   bG  S
T
Þ
 
¼ lmax 0:5þ 0:25ð½I   bG  S
  1
½I   bG  S
T
þ ½I   bG  S
  T
½I   bG  SÞ
 
 0:5þ 0:25  lmax I   bG  S½ 
  1 I   bG  S½ 
T
þ I   bG  S½ 
  T I   bG  S½ 
  
:
ð33Þ
Since |λ ([I − βG−S]−1[I − βG−S]T)| = |λ([I − βG−S]−T[I − βG−S])| = 1 and ([I − βG−S]−1[I −
βG−S]
T)−1 = ([I − βG−S]−T[I − βG−S], let exp(iw) and exp(−iw) be the eigenvalue of [I −
βG−S]
−1[I − βG−S]T and [I − βG−S]−T[I − βG−S], respectively, where w 2 [0, 2π). As a result, it
holds that
lmaxð½I   bG  S
  1
½I   bG
  S
T
þ ½I   bG
  S
  T
½I   bG
  SÞ ¼ expðiwÞ þ expð  iwÞ ¼ 2 cosw  2; ð34Þ
and if and only if w = 0, the equality holds.
To summarize, if X  S 6¼ X
T
  S (or G  S 6¼ G
T
  S), 1  R  SðGÞ < 1  R  Sð~GÞ, and if and only if
X  S ¼ X
T
  S (or G  S ¼ G
T
  S), 1  R  SðGÞ ¼ 1  R  Sð~GÞ. Property E3 holds.
As Property E2 has proven that liability size is an influencing factor of systemic risk, we
here fix the liability size and keep each bank’s total loan and borrowing amounts unchanged in
order to precisely study the influence of liability distribution on system risk. Although various
liability distributions could exist in real interbank system, Property E3 uncovers that pairwise
Network-based risk measurements for interbank systems
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0200209 July 12, 2018 13 / 18
liabilities symmetrically distributed among the banks, without changing the liability size, can
lead to a smaller system risk degree irrespective of the variety of liability distributions.
4.4 Risk measurements as a function of bank size
Here we define the bank size as the amount of total liquidity a bank holds. Considering the
bank size as the main factor and keeping the lending-borrowing matrix X unchanged, when
bank i does not belong to the initial default set S and its size becomes larger, this subsection
further checks whether the defined risk degree can reflect the change of bank size. The follow-
ing Property E4 provides the result.
[Property E4] For any given system G, a new system ~G is generated by keeping the lending-
borrowing matrix X unchanged and the size of bank i becomes larger, that is, XðGÞ ¼ Xð~GÞ
and aliðGÞ < alið~GÞ. Then, for any given default set S that does not contain bank i, it holds that
ri;SðGÞ < ri;Sð~GÞ and rvSðGÞ > rvSð~GÞ.
Proof. Based on the operation described here, the relationship between ~G  S and G−S is
g~ ii ¼
aliðGÞ
aliðG~Þ
gii þ 1  
aliðGÞ
aliðG~Þ
; when j ¼ i;
g~ ij ¼
aliðGÞ
aliðG~Þ
gij; when j 6¼ i;
g~kj ¼ gkj; when k 6¼ i:
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
ð35Þ
Then, we have I   ~G  S ¼ Ti  I   G  Sð Þ and, further, I   b ~G  S ¼ I   bG  Sð Þ þ bðTi   IÞ
I   G  Sð Þ, where Ti is a #(N − S) × #(N − S) diagonal matrix whose ith element is aliðGÞ=alið~GÞ
and the remaining elements are all 1. Then, ri;Sð~GÞ can be expressed as a function of Ti as fol-
lows, where 1i is an #(N − S) vector whose ith element is 1 and the remaining elements are 0.
Then, we further have
ri;Sð~GÞ ¼
1i  ½I   b ~G  S
  1
 1T
n
¼
1i  ½ I   bG  Sð Þ þ bðTi   IÞ  I   G  Sð Þ
  1
 1T
n
: ð36Þ
Here, (I − βG−S) + β(Ti − I)  (I − G−S) = (I − βG−S)[I + β(I − βG−S)−1(Ti − I)  (I − G−S)],
and note that
d 1i  I   bG  Sð Þ þ b Ti   Ið Þ  I   G  Sð Þ½ 
  1
 1T
  
dðTi   IÞi
¼   b1i  I   b ~G  S
   1
diagð1iÞ I   G  Sð Þ I   b ~G  S
   1
 1T
<   b1i  I   b ~G  S
   1
diagð1iÞ I   bG  Sð Þ I   b ~G  S
   1
 1T
¼   b1i  I   b ~G  S
   1
 1T < 0:
ð37Þ
Thus, 1i  [(I − βG−S) + β(Ti − I)  (I − G−S)]−1  1T > 1i  (I − βG−S)−1  1T. That is,
ri;Sð~GÞ > ri;SðGÞ. In addition, by replacing 1
T
i with 1
T in Eqs (36) and (37), we can immediately
obtain that
1  ½ I   bG  Sð Þ þ bðTi   IÞ  I   G  Sð Þ
  1
 1T
n
>
1  I   bG  Sð Þ
  1
 1T
n
; ð38Þ
which equals rvSðGÞ > rvSð~GÞ.
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Property E4 demonstrates the intuition that a larger bank size decreases the systemic risk,
which means larger size is a good buffer for insolvency contagion, and indicates that the pro-
posed measurements can well reflect the effect of bank size on system risk.
4.5 Risk measurements as a function of the discount factor
This subsection focuses on how each bank’s discount factor ηi affects the defined risk distance
and risk degree. Intuitively, an increase in ηi means a stronger ability to liquidate assets; thus,
systemic risk should decrease. Here, for any given default set S, we check whether the risk dis-
tance from bank i to S increases and the corresponding risk degree rvS decreases. The follow-
ing Property E5 provides the answer.
[Property E5] For any given default set S, if there exists a bank set X such that X \ S = F
and ~Z i > Zi for any i 2 X in the new system ~G, then the risk distance ri,S is longer in ~G and the
risk degree rvSð~GÞ is smaller compared to the original G, where i 2 X.
Proof. The relationship between ~G and G is I   ~G  S ¼ Qi  I   G  Sð Þ, and further,
I   b ~G  S ¼ I   bG  Sð Þ þ bðQi   IÞ  I   G  Sð Þ, where Qi is a #(N − S) × #(N − S)diagonal
matrix whose ith element is aliðGÞ=ðaliðGÞ þ ð~Z i   ZiÞðpi þ siÞÞ for i 2 X and the remaining
elements are all 1. Then, this problem has the same structure with Property E4, and therefore,
according to the conclusion provided in Property E4, Property E5 holds.
Property E5 validates the intuition that a rise in the discount factor of some banks will
increase the risk distance and decrease the level of system risk. More importantly, the proposed
measurements make it possible to reflect the effect of the discount factor, which implies that
the effective liquidity management of every bank will benefit the safety of a financial system.
5 Conclusions, discussions and future work
This paper belongs to the growing literature that focuses on designing appropriate measure-
ments to evaluate systemic risk in financial networks [28–30]. Specifically, we aim to measure
two kinds of risks: one is the susceptibility of each bank to the distress of an initial default set
from the microscopic angle, and the other is the the degree of the systemic failures due to con-
tagion of counterparty risk from the macroscopic angle. To this end, this paper proposed a
series of computationally tractable measurements that are risk distance, risk degree and m-
order risk degree, among which the first one captures the first kind of risk and the latter two
capture the second kind. Furthermore, this paper also uncovers their basic and extended prop-
erties. Regarding the basic properties, we show that the risk distance satisfies non-negativity,
asymmetry and monotonicity, and that the risk degree and the m-order risk degree follows
monotonicity and heterogeneity. In particular, heterogeneity implies that our measurements
support neither “too central to fail” [31] nor “too diverse to fail” [32], owing that different
orders reflect different dimensions. On the other hand, the proven extended properties show
that our measurements are able to reflect the effect of bank size, liability size, liability distribu-
tion and the discount factor on the default risk of one bank and also on the failures of the
entire system. Moreover, the rationality of our measurements is embodied not only in the
proven basic and extended properties but also in the relationship between the risk distance
and financial contagion. From the perspective of methodology, the proposed risk distance is a
node-level microscopic indicator that reflects the default likelihood of each remaining bank
when an initial default set is given., while the proposed risk degree and m-order risk degree is a
system-level macroscopic indicator that reflects the collapsing force of the given default sets.
Both of them inherit the basic framework of the classical Katz-Bonacich centrality and estab-
lish a Markov transfer matrix with absorbing states.
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Based on the proposed measurements, this paper also provides some implications for guid-
ing how to decrease or prevent the systemic risk of interbank systems: (1) since liability size
influences systemic risk, it is an effective method for controlling the level of total credits within
normal levels, such as deleveraging; (2) a symmetric liability distribution between pairwise
banks will create a safer system under the precondition that the borrowing amount of each
bank is equal to its loan amount; (3) the targeted liquidity injection is useful because banks
with large bank size or liquidities are good buffers in the way of insolvency contagion; (4)
enhancing the ability of banks to liquidate their assets or raise their capital adequacy ratios will
decrease systemic risk.
Two issues are further discussed here: one is related to the problem of missing information
and the other is related to varieties of measures of controlling the system risk. With regards to
the first issue, one precondition of this paper is to know all the information about each bank’s
balance sheet. However, granular data on financial networks is often lacking and the limited-
ness of the information available always exists in real practice. Thus, how to achieve the miss-
ing information and how to make decisions based on partial information also become two
potential problem, although they are not deeply discussed in our work. Fortunately, [33] and
[34] provided some feasible approaches to cope with the problem. Based on their work, once
the missing information is estimated, our approach and the main results can also be adopted
to analyze the risk contagion of interbank system. With regards to the second issue, apart from
the above suggested measures of controlling the system risk, many others are also potentially
useful in the context of network-based interbank system. For example, [35] uncovered how
the topological features of network structures influence the risk contagion and suggested
avoiding the measures such as market integration and diversification to decrease system stabil-
ity, and [36] studied how types of debt contracts affected the system risk and suggested a more
suitable type of contract that guaranteed for a unique Pareto efficient clearing payment vector.
Accordingly, the mentioned two papers enrich the measures to reduce the system risk, which
guides our future work to extend our proven properties.
In our opinion, it is meaningful to explore the relationship between the network structure
and the proposed m-order system value because doing so may provide specific guidance on
how to design a robust network structure under certain conditions. To this end, we suggest
plotting all the different-order risk degrees on one line graph for finding out a sudden change
on risk degrees in the process of adding banks into the given initial default set, which is a visual
way to identify the influence of financial contagion. Moreover, note that the fix-point method
captures the system risk under another mechanism of risk contagion different with ours [1],
and therefore it will be interesting to check whether the fix-point method also shares the simi-
lar properties with ours. In addition, since this paper focuses on only interbank interactions
with a balance-sheet mechanism, it would be interesting to study a more general framework
that extends the interbank system to a generalized financial system that includes more types of
financial institutions and interaction.
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